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Abstract: Scholars of federalism have offered different reasons why federations are 
formed. One of the most notable works in this area is that of William H. Riker, who 
made no pretence about his attempt to build a general theory of federalism, particularly 
its origin, operation and significance. Central to the Rikerian theory is that federations 
are formed through a political bargain between two sets of rational politicians, and the 
motive for the federal bargain is principally military. This theory is predicated on the 
assumption that two conditions – the expansion condition, and the military condition – 
must be present for a federation to be formed. In reference to the Nigerian Federation 
established in 1954, Riker asserted that the expansionist ambition of Ghana and its 
then leader Kwame Nkrumah, was the main external threat that informed the formation 
of the Federation. The main aim in this paper is to argue that the Rikerian theory of 
federal formation is inadequate to explain the origin of the Nigerian Federation, 
especially in the light of the centripetal and centrifugal forces that combined to result in 
the Federation. 
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Introduction 
Scholars of federalism have, in varying degrees, emphasised the causal relationship 
between the origin and success or failure of federations. For instance, Hicks (1978: 5) 
has particularly suggested that the historic origin of federations affects “their 
Constitutions and the working thereof”. Stepan (2001: 320) also reminds us that a 
distinction must be made between federations whose main purpose is to “come 
together”, and those whose purpose is to “hold together”. This explains why scholars 
often lay emphasis on the centripetal as well as the centrifugal forces that bring about a 
federal system of government. However, different explanations have been offered in this 
regard. In this paper, attempt is made to subsume these explanations under two 
theories: the socio-economic theory, and the political theory, with the former arguing that 
federations come into being as a result of the presence of certain social, economic, 
historical and geographical factors, whilst the latter, anchored by Riker, contends that 
federations result from the presence of some political forces. The political theory, 
otherwise referred to in this paper as the Rikerian theory, rejects the socio-economic 
explanation of federal formation. 
Nigeria's federal experience began in 1954 under the tutelage of the British colonial 
authority and the fundamental aim of the Federation was to hold together the diverse 
groups that have been lumped together in the British-inspired contraption called Nigeria. 
The formation of the Nigerian Federation has elicited divergent views from scholars, but 
our main focus in this paper is to reject the Rikerian thesis, which rejects the presence of 
socio-economic conditions in the calculation to arrive at a federal political framework for 
the country. Therefore, our central argument is that the federal solution in Nigeria was 
necessitated by the desire to achieve ‘unity in diversity’ and this was made possible by 
the presence of certain socio-economic forces. Put differently, the paper brings to the 
fore the gaps in Riker’s theory of origin of federations in general and that of Nigeria in 
particular. In this paper therefore, an attempt is made to shed more light on those 
circumstances that culminated in the Nigerian Federation, with a view to proving that the 
socio-economic theory of federal formation best explains the birth of the Federation.  
The remaining part of the paper is divided into three main sections. The first examines 
Riker’s political theory of federal formations in general, while the second, which focuses 
on the origin of the Nigerian Federation hinges upon those social, economic and political 
forces that paved the way for a federal system of government in Nigeria, and the third, 
which concludes the paper, highlights the flaws in the Rikerian theory of federal origin. 
Riker’s Political Theory of Federal Formations  
As already mentioned, the most notable work on the political theory of origin of 
federations is that of Riker, who made no pretence about his attempt to build a theory 
particularly on the origin of federations, and the operation and significance of federalism. 
Riker’s intention was to develop a political science that would provide “testable and 
tested generalisations”, and he rationalised his decision to do this by lamenting that, 
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As a political scientist, I have always regretted that much of what passes as 
scientific investigation in our field is no more than elaboration of unique detail, e.g., 
the case study of a particular event, the history of a particular institution, the 
evaluation of a particular policy, the description of a particular culture (Riker, 1964: 
xi). 
 
Given this assertion, it becomes pertinent to begin with Riker’s notion of federalism, as 
this may offer an insight into his theory. Riker defined federalism as “a bargain between 
prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of 
aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies” (ibid.: 11). Implicit in this 
definition is that the bargain is like a contract involving some offer and acceptance. It 
also implies that the ‘rational’ politicians making the offer must be convinced of the 
benefits derivable from the proposed union, while their counterparts accepting the offer 
would also have to be convinced that the advantages of belonging to the union outweigh 
the disadvantages. According to Riker, 
 
The politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control, usually 
either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or 
diplomatic aggression and aggrandisement. The politicians who accept the bargain, 
giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so because of 
some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. Either they desire protection 
from an external threat or they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the 
federation (ibid.: 13). 
 
Riker’s theory is therefore predicated on the assumption that federalism is an outcome 
of political bargaining among rational politicians, built upon a two-fold hypothesis: the 
expansion condition, and the military condition, which according to Riker, are necessary 
for the formation of a federation.  
 
Riker began the formulation of his theory by bluntly dismissing earlier ideas on the 
formation of federations as “ideological” and “reductionist” fallacies, and particularly 
branded Deutsch’s explanation of social and economic conditions as a “reductionist 
fallacy” (ibid.: 15). The main weakness of Deutsch’s nine “essential conditions”, he 
argued, is that it precludes the political aspect of federal formation – a political bargain 
between two sets of politicians. The following more aptly presents the argument against 
the Deutsch conditions: “in bypassing the political, in bypassing the act of bargaining 
itself, it leaves out the crucial condition of the predisposition to make the bargain” (ibid.: 
16). Riker contended further that the list only provides a set of frequently observed 
conditions that propel politicians towards a predisposition to unite in some way or 
another. For Riker, therefore, earlier ideas on the formation of federations are ideological 
rather than scientific.  
 
In an attempt to justify the validity of his data and also to demonstrate that his theory 
was scientific, Riker claimed to have examined “all the instances of the creation of a 
federalism since 1786, given most detailed attention to the invention of centralised 
federalism in the United States”, and then concluded that “the military and expansion 
conditions are necessary to the occurrence of federalism” (ibid.: 13). This implies that 
these two conditions were particularly present in virtually all federations, including 
Nigeria. It is therefore important to verify briefly Riker’s claim in some of the other 
federations he examined before focusing on Nigeria.  
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Let us begin with Australia, where Riker conceded that economic factors cannot be 
completely ignored in the formation of the federation, and also that there was no 
immediate threat when the federation was formed. However, he pointed out that the 
presence of some “military-diplomatic concerns” informed the decision taken by the 
founding fathers of the country (ibid.: 27). The two main claims made by Riker regarding 
Australia can be summarised thus: that the formation of the Australian Federation was 
precipitated by the fear of Japanese imperialism in East Asia, and that because these 
threats were relatively weak, it was necessary only to create a relatively peripheralised 
federation that reflected the strength of provincial as opposed to national loyalties. In the 
case of India, Riker posited that the formation of the federation was occasioned by 
external threats from Pakistan, which was “more warlike, better armed, and more 
resentful”, and internal threats from the princely states, which were “a collection of 
partially self-governing colonies in 1947” (ibid.: 29). Riker, however, recognised the 
influence of the constitutional engineering that culminated in the formation of the Indian 
Federation, particularly the influence of The Government of India Act of 1935, yet 
preferred to argue that the two forms of threat mentioned earlier combined to give birth 
to the Federation. For Malaysia, Riker asserted authoritatively that the formation of the 
Malaysian Federation fulfils his hypothesis. Specifically, he claimed that the military 
condition was present and was evidenced in "the existence of communist guerrillas, 
supported from  China", whilst the expansion condition was also present due to the need 
to reconcile the previously federated states (ibid.: 31). He declared with certainty that, 
“the clearly discernible motive for this federalism was, therefore, a fear of Indonesian 
imperialism and a reluctance, on the part of Singapore, Borneo, and others to accept 
Malayan domination” (ibid.). Finally, in the case of Nigeria, Riker's position was that the 
main external threat that led to the formation of the Federation was the expansionist 
ambition of Ghana (we shall shed more light on this in the next section).  
 
In a stunning criticism of Riker’s theory of origin, Dikshit (1971; 1975) asserted that 
Riker was neither the first nor the only scholar to point out the importance of a military 
condition or external threat, or the expansion condition, as this had been articulated by 
scholars before Riker, including William Maddox, H. R. G. Greaves and Kenneth 
Wheare. For example, Maddox (1941: 1122) had observed that some of the motivations 
behind the formation of federations are: fear, a calculated expectation of advantage, and 
a response to some unifying ideal or myth; but fear which may develop from direct 
attempts at intimidation, or from a sustained and profound feeling of insecurity, is the 
most important of these political or psychological forces. Dikshit (1975: 223) particularly 
dismissed Riker’s theory as untenable on the ground that his own study of the 
federations of West Germany and Austria had demonstrated that Riker’s so-called 
necessary conditions were absent. 
 
Also critical of Riker’s account of federal formation is Davis (1978: 133), who 
commenced his criticism of Riker’s political conditions by arguing that all unions are 
formed, in the first place with the primary desire to promote the well-being of their 
members, implying that security is the underlying motive “in the calculation of all 
communities which seek greater strength through association”. Another critic of Riker’s 
theory is King (1982), observing that it is obvious that, to every state, there is always 
some risk of external war and domestic dissension, and that the source of risk is three-
fold: threat to a particular state from within the state; threat to one state from another 
state; and threat to allied states from another state (King, 1982: 35-6). In other words, 
threat from within the state may provoke that state to form a union, just like threat to one 
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state from another may provoke a federation between them, and according to King, this 
appears to have been the case with the federations of the United States, Switzerland 
and Nigeria. Therefore, King observes that if the birth of a federation is predicated upon 
fear of other powers, then any type of fear must provide grounds for federal union; so, 
Riker’s ‘threat’ criterion is unfounded. 
 
Similarly, Stepan (2005) also criticised Riker’s views on federal origin for focusing 
exclusively on the American model of federation, which represents the oldest and the 
most successful federation in the world. Perhaps in an attempt to simplify the debate on 
the origin of federations, Stepan chose to examine the modes of federal creation rather 
than the factors that give birth to federations, and therefore came up with the following 
three main typologies of federal formations: coming together; holding together; and 
putting together. In this categorisation, the American, Swiss and Australian Federations 
are referred to as “coming together” federations in that previously sovereign units had 
pooled their sovereignties while retaining their individual identities, and a “holding 
together” federation is when an existing unitary state, usually characterised by “historical 
and political logic”, decides to become a federation, and finally, a “putting together” 
federation involves the use of coercion to put together previously independent states 
(Stepan, 2005: 257-8). Based on Stepan’s typology, Nigeria and India exemplify holding 
together federations because the constituent units that merged to form the respective 
federations were not sovereign compared with the American states, whilst the former 
Soviet Union typifies a putting together federation.  
 
It must be stated at this juncture that some scholars are sympathetic to the Rikerian 
theory. Notable among them is McKay (2004: 170), who observes that the main critique 
of the Rikerian theory revolves around Riker’s insistence that the threats to external or 
internal security must always be present for a federation to be formed and must always 
be military/diplomatic in nature. McKay contends that Riker’s theory cannot simply be 
flawed on the ground that all countries actually or potentially face threats, as claimed by 
other critics such as King. Pitching tent with Riker, McKay also argued that external 
threats may lead to annexation, treaty or war, and/or federation, especially when certain 
special conditions are met, and the level of threat will determine the particular 
arrangements arrived at. Nevertheless, McKay concedes that Riker’s exclusion of the 
social and economic conditions is too restrictive because these factors were equally 
important to federal formation, but has praised Riker’s theory for providing “us with the 
most effective heuristic tools at our disposal in this subject area” (ibid.: 182).   
The Socio-economic Theory and the Formation of the Nigerian Federation  
In regards to the origin of the Nigerian Federation, Riker specifically contended that the 
expansionist ambition of Ghana and its then leader Kwame Nkrumah was the main 
external threat that informed the formation of the federation. Without mincing words, 
Riker authoritatively argued that, “Nkrumah’s emphasis on Pan-Africanism was at its 
height and no Nigerian leader could fail to be aware of the proximity of the Western (and 
depressed and minority) region of Nigeria to Ghana” (Riker, 1964: 31). The point being 
made here is that Nkrumah’s idea of pan-Africanism was based on his personal 
ambition to bring the entire sub-continent of West Africa under his leadership. The 
internal threat, on the other hand, according to Riker, was “the unwillingness of Nigerian 
leaders to upset the bargain the British had made for them” (ibid.: 32).  
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These assertions attracted a lot of criticisms from Nigerian scholars as well as those 
familiar with Nigeria’s political history. One account of Nigeria’s federal formation that 
could be easily juxtaposed with Riker’s is that of Anthony Birch, whose views on 
Nigerian politics in general would seem more accurate given his sound knowledge of the 
country. Birch acted as consultant to the Western Region government from 1956 to 1958 
(Birch, 1966: 23). Although, it could be argued that Birch served in Nigeria after the 
introduction of federalism yet his knowledge of the country cannot be overstated. Birch 
noted that nothing suggests that Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist ambition had any influence 
on Nigerian regional leaders’ decision to opt for a federal political framework. Also, the 
Nigerian doyen of federalism, the late Professor Eme Awa, had contended that the main 
internal threat instrumental to the formation of the Nigerian federal union was the fear of 
insecurity felt by mainly some minority ethnic groups in the country (Awa, 1976: 19). 
Another critique of Riker’s explanation in regards to the creation of the Nigerian 
Federation is Eleazu (1977: 18), who found Riker’s explanation preposterous, arguing 
that the federal idea in Nigeria was conceived while Nkrumah was still in the United 
States studying, and besides, most Nigerian leaders shared, in varying degrees, the 
Pan-African ideology. 
 
In a similar vein, Davis (1978: 126-6; 133) also dismissed Riker’s work as belonging to 
the “quasi-scientific style of the behavioural movement”, aspiring to transcend the 
“unique” historical and cultural setting of each federal experience to establish “tested 
and testable” generalisation, and also reporting his findings in a typical “lab- science 
mode of reporting”, but he salutes Riker’s courage for assigning a significant and 
constant responsibility to the military condition. In specific reference to Nigeria, Davis 
criticised Riker for translating history “with the reductionist zeal of a salvationist, an 
apocalyptic or materialist historian” (ibid.: 136). This implies that Riker either 
misunderstood or misinterpreted Nigerian political history, and this had resulted in an 
erroneous conclusion. As if echoing Awa, King (1982: 35) also argued that the potential 
threat within Nigeria was the fear of each of the three main Regions that the other two 
would combine against it. Similarly, Elaigwu (2006: 211) had argued that mutual fears 
and suspicions of domination among the different ethnic groups within the country 
reinforced the colonial authority’s calculation to promote the idea of federalism in 
Nigeria. Consequently, it is clear from the various accounts that have been presented 
thus far that some threats partly acted to influence the federalising process, but these 
threats, contrary to Riker’s assertion, were internal from other regions within the country, 
and not from outside. 
 
Therefore, it becomes imperative at this juncture to turn our attention to the socio-
economic factors that usually result in the birth of federal unions. Very instructive here is 
Deutsch’s explanation of social and economic conditions that give rise to federations. 
These conditions are as follows:  
 
1) Mutual compatibility of main value; 2) a distinctive way of life; 3) expectations of 
stronger economic ties or gains; 4) marked increase in political and administrative 
capabilities of at least some participating units; 5) superior economic growth on the part 
of at least some participating units; 6) unbroken links of social communication, both 
geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; 7) a 
broadening of the political elite; 8) mobility of persons at least among the politically 
relevant strata; and 9) a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions (see 
Riker 1964: 15).  
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According to Birch, of the nine conditions postulated by Deutsch, the following four were 
instrumental to the establishment of Nigeria's federal system: expectations of stronger 
economic ties or gains; a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of 
at least some participating units; superior economic growth on the part of at least some 
participating units; and a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions.  
 
Also important here is Wheare’s position that some political, social and economic factors 
combined to contribute to the formation of federations, and these particularly informed 
the formation of the federation of the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia, 
and they include:  
 
1) A sense of military insecurity and of the consequent need for common defence; 2) A 
desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realisation that only through union 
could independence be secured; 3) A hope of economic advantage from union; 4) Some 
political association of the communities concerned prior to their federal union either in a 
loose confederation, ... or as parts of the same Empire, ...; 5) Geographical 
neighbourhood; and 6) similarity of political institutions (Wheare, 1963: 37).  
 
Nonetheless, Wheare warned that, “it is not possible to pick on any one of them or any 
one combination of them and say that unless this or these are present, the desire for 
federal union will not arise; that desire may be produced by any one of them” (ibid.: 42). 
For Birch, the last four of Wheare’s conditions – a hope of economic advantage from 
union; some previous political association; geographical neighbourhood; and similarity 
of political institutions – were present in the creation of the Federation, but the first 
condition – a sense of military insecurity and the consequent need for common defence 
– was absent because the French neighbouring countries did not pose any kind of 
military threat to Nigeria (Birch, 1966: 23). Moreover, Birch argued that the Western 
Region of Nigeria, which Riker described as “depressed”, was in fact the most 
prosperous of the three Nigerian Regions, and at the time of the bargain Nigerian 
leaders showed no disposition to sympathise with Nkrumah’s ambitions. Armed with 
empirical evidence, Birch therefore found it easy to dismiss Riker’s account of Nigerian 
federal formation as misleading. However, Afigbo (1991:14) has argued that the 
geographic and economic configuration of Nigeria cannot be used to make a strong 
case for any particular government arrangement – unitary, federal or confederal. This 
counter-argument notwithstanding, it may be misleading to assume that the multicultural 
nature of the Nigerian society, for instance, can be ruled out in the calculation to 
federalise the previously unitary state.  
 
According to Watts (1966), the motives for union in the new federations were much 
more complex than in the old ones, and therefore produced a comprehensive list of 
socio-economic conditions that predicated the formation of these new federations. 
Watts' “new Federations” were India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rhodesia, and the 
West Indies while the “old Federations” were United States, Switzerland, Canada, and 
Australia. Watts’ conditions are:  
 
1. The desire for political independence; 2. The hope of economic advantage; 3. The 
need for administrative efficiency; 4. The enhancing of the conduct of external relations, 
both diplomatic and military; 5. a community of outlook based on race, religion, 
language, or culture; 6. geographical factors; 7. the influence of history; 8. Similarities 
and differences in colonial and indigenous political and social institutions; 9. the 
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character of political leadership; 10. The existence of successful older models of federal 
union; and 11 the influence of the United Kingdom government in constitution-making 
(Watts, 1966: 42).  
 
This list is similar to that of Wheare, but could be seen as an improvement, and each of 
the factors is, potentially, either “unifying or separating” (Watts, 1966: 42); “centripetal or 
centrifugal” (Davis, 1978: 128). Watts concluded his survey of the six new federations by 
highlighting the two main features common to them all: a geographical distribution of the 
diversities within each of these societies, which results in the demands for regional 
political autonomy; and the existence of some form of desire to be united (Watts, 1966.: 
93). Watts’ main argument is that the impact of political, social, cultural, economic and 
historical factors cannot be overemphasised in the formation of the modern federations, 
including Nigeria.  
 
As specifically observed by Watts, the hope of economic advantage, or more precisely, 
regional economic interdependence, was one of the decisive factors in the federalising 
process that culminated in the birth of the federation of Nigeria in 1954. Awa had also 
mentioned that the economies of the territories that later came together were 
complementary, arguing that the Eastern Region had a large reservoir of unskilled, 
semi-skilled and skilled labour, the economic success of which was built on palm oil, the 
Northern Region was rich in groundnut and cotton, while the Western Region was a 
great producer of cocoa and also had a large reservoir of professionals and bureaucrats 
(Awa, 1976: 25). These arguments have been corroborated by Suberu (2001: 19; 21; 
2004: 330), arguing that the decision to federalise the hitherto unitary state in 1954 
owed to “the country’s deep cultural fragmentation, the aggravation of this diversity by 
sundry colonial policies, and the enormous attraction that federalist guarantees of 
subnational autonomy had for Nigeria’s rising political elite".  
 
Similarly, the role played by common historical factors as well as the similarity of political 
institutions in inducing communities to desire a federal union cannot be 
overemphasised. Sharing a common historical association has a tendency to exert a 
unifying influence. This reinforces Watts’ argument, that the historical impact of British 
rule was also a significant factor in the creation of the Nigerian Federation. All regions in 
the country, despite their differences, shared a history of British rule. Indeed, one of the 
founding fathers of the country, Dr Nnamdi Azikwe, once described Nigeria as “a political 
union which has been forged on the anvil of British rule” (Azikwe, 1961: 190 cited in 
Watts, 1966: 57). 
 
At this juncture, it becomes imperative to turn our attention to one significant factor in 
the birth of the Nigerian Federation, and that is the desire to form a federal union. 
According to Wheare, the main driving force behind the formation of a federation is the 
willingness or desire of communities “to be united, but not to be unitary” (Wheare, 1963: 
36, emphasis added). By implication, therefore, what is essential to the formation of a 
federal union in Wheare’s view, is the desire to want to come together under a single 
political umbrella. Wheare had earlier suggested that as a compromise, the minority 
nation should be willing to be part of the union, but also that the majority nation should 
be prepared to tolerate the existence of the minority nation (Wheare, 1962). Concurring 
with Wheare, Watts also argued that the main distinguishing characteristic of the old 
federations was the existence of a desire to be united under a single general 
government, and specifically that one of the main motives for the formation of the 
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Nigerian Federation is the desire for political independence from the British colonial 
authorities (Watts, 1966: 43, emphasis added). Watts’ notion of “desire” in the creation of 
a federal union came under attack from Davis, arguing that it is not possible to measure 
a “balance of desire”, and therefore, “a theory of federal parturition relying on a balance 
of ambivalent desires” cannot explain why federal unions are formed (Davis, 1978: 141). 
But Burgess (2006: 81), who has also criticised Riker for abuse of history, amplified 
Wheare’s and Watts’ positions, arguing that analytically, there is a two-step process 
involved in the creation of a federation: the first is the desire for a union, while the 
second is the decision to have a federal union. Burgess, whose claim is predicated on 
his study of the federations of Switzerland, Canada, Australia, India, Malaysia, Austria 
and Germany, found Riker’s “framework of analysis” wanting (ibid.: 100).  
 
It is instructive to point out at this stage that during the decolonisation period, Nigerian 
political leaders favoured a federal state on the ground that federalism would guarantee 
the accommodation of diversity in the country. This brings us to another important factor 
that cannot be ignored in the origin of the federation, and that is the role of leadership, a 
factor that was later alluded to by Wheare and echoed by other scholars after him, 
arguing that able leadership is needed to translate the desire for federation into reality. 
For instance, Watts (1966: 61) had argued that federations are based on compromises, 
which require political leadership capable of being conciliatory, and that the influence 
and charismatic leadership of Nehru and Gandhi played a significant part in the 
formation of the Indian Federation. Also, the importance of the leadership factor in the 
formation of a federal union was emphasised by Awa, arguing that, "all the other factors 
which help in the formation of a federation” are “merely the raw materials which underlie 
the formation of a union” (Awa, 1976: 30-1; see also Eleazu, 1977: 18). In Nigeria, 
regional leaders, using their ethno-regional political parties as platforms, promoted the 
idea of federalism. 
 
Nigerian regional leaders were very active in their collaboration with the British 
authorities in advocating the federal idea. Southern elites, notably Nnamdi Azikiwe and 
Obafemi Awolowo, favoured a federal system of government, believing that federalism 
would promote unity in diversity. For example, Azikiwe had in his book, Political Blueprint 
of Nigeria, published in 1943, envisaged a federal commonwealth of Nigeria, made up of 
eight “protectorates” based on ethnic affiliation, while Awolowo also used his book, Path 
to Nigerian Freedom, published in 1947, to argue that only a federal system would suit 
Nigeria’s political conditions. It is important to point out here that Nigerian leaders 
actively participated in the various Constitutional Conferences that culminated in the 
Federal Constitution of 1954. There was a political bargain between Nigerian regional 
political leaders, and not between national and constituent leaders as contended by 
Riker. This bargain took place during the Ibadan Constitutional Conference of 1951 and 
the London Constitutional Conference of 1954, where these regional leaders jettisoned 
their differences to arrive at a compromise. Nigerian leaders arrived at a federal idea, 
believing that “only federal states have the institutional and structural capacity both to 
accommodate and reconcile different forms of unity with different forms of diversity” 
(Burgess, 1999: 1). 
 
Another indication that federalism was negotiated, agreed and welcomed by all regional 
leaders emerged when Dr Nnamdi Azikwe, who became a member of the federal House 
of Representatives in 1954, remarked that, “as for me and those who think like me 
politically, we are determined to make the revised constitution an avenue for holding the 
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country together through a strong federal government” (NAI, NL/H2 Nigeria, House of 
Representatives Debates, Third Session, March 8, 1954: 37 quoted in Osadolor, 1998: 
43, emphasis added). In a similar vein, the country’s first prime minister, Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, remarked in the federal House of Representatives in 1957 that, “I am 
pleased to see that we are all agreed that the federal system is, under the present 
conditions, the only sure basis on which Nigeria can remain united” (Tafawa Balewa, Mr 
Prime Minister, p.2 quoted in Adamolekun and Ayo, 1989: 157). According to Awa (1964: 
48), these leaders “regarded federalism as a philosophy of opportunity” in which every 
federating unit would be allowed to develop at the pace determined by the ability of its 
leaders and by its natural resources (see also Suberu, 2001: 25; Elaigwu, 2007: 25; 
Oyovbaire, 1983: 9; 13). This again reinforces our assertion that the decision to 
federalise the previously unitary state was characterised by concessions and 
compromises. It also attests to the view that, generally, federation is a child of 
compromise, an equilibrium between centrifugal and centripetal forces, or “a perfect 
balance or compromise between the extremes” (Maddox, 1941: 1121). Therefore, it is 
our contention in this paper that it is misleading to argue that a federal political 
framework was imposed on Nigeria; such argument is a misinterpretation of Nigeria’s 
political history. 
 
It may be argued that the British colonial authorities ‘sold’ the idea of federalism to 
Nigeria’s regional leaders because the British wanted their creation to survive even after 
their departure. For the British, therefore, the differences among the Nigerian peoples in 
terms of language, religion and historical background could only be accommodated in a 
federal political system, where each region would be allowed to maintain its identity and 
yet remain in a federal Nigeria. For Osuntokun (1979: 98-9), the promotion of the federal 
idea by the British colonial authorities “was not out of altruistic motives. British 
investment in Nigeria was already substantial and it was not in the interest of British 
capitalists to see the edifice … collapse like a house of cards”, given the fact that Nigeria 
was then the largest market in Africa for raw materials for British industries.  
The Rikerian Theory: A Scientific Fallacy 
There is no doubt that scholars familiar with the history of federalism in Nigeria hold 
divergent views on the factors responsible for the federalising process: some have 
leaned towards the position that the presence of social and economic factors are 
responsible, while others have contended that the impact of British colonialism was the 
decisive factor in the decision to federalise the hitherto unitary state, but none seems to 
be sympathetic to the Rikerian thesis. In this paper, it has been demonstrated thus far 
that the factors that gave birth to the Nigerian Federation are many, and much complex 
than Riker would want us to believe. For example, federalism was promoted in Nigeria 
by the British colonial authority, first for administrative convenience, and later as a basis 
for constitutional reform and for economic reasons. Economic interdependence, the 
desire to achieve independence and the effect of common British rule, all contributed to 
lay the foundation for a federal system for the country. It thus appears merely 
convenient to argue that imperatives of administrative convenience and the existence of 
certain social, political, economic, historical and geographical conditions combined to 
give birth to the Nigerian Federation. Most significantly, the federal solution was 
necessitated by the desire to achieve ‘unity in diversity’. Therefore, Riker’s rejection of 
social and economic conditions in the creation of federations, and his exclusive focus on 
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political conditions, render his theory inadequate to explain the formation of a federation 
like Nigeria. In other words, it is misleading to suggest that the origin of the Nigerian 
Federation followed the same process as that of the United States.  
 
The question at this juncture, therefore, is: How valid is Riker’s ‘theory’ of federal 
formation, especially in relation to Nigeria? Validity is needed in order to arrive at 
generalisation (Bell, 1999). It is important that empirical measures are valid because 
they result in the formulation of a theory, but if not, it is more likely that decisions made 
based on the results of that measure will be erroneous, as aptly demonstrated with the 
Rikerian theory. For instance, Riker’s external threat condition remains a trivial one, and 
this makes generalisation difficult. Generalisability refers to the extent that the results of 
the research and analysis apply to a wider group than just the ones investigated in the 
original study (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Like reliability and validity, generalisability 
is also considered as a criterion for assessing the quality of social science research.  
 
One may therefore conclude that Riker’s reliance on the political conditions that gave 
birth to the American Federation to make a generalisation, as well as the rejection of 
social and economic factors in the origin of federations lack scientific attributes. One 
finds it difficult not to concur with the empirical postulations provided by eminent 
scholars sympathetic to the socio-economic theory of federal formations. In other words, 
the socio-economic theory may best be used to explain the origin of the Nigerian 
Federation. Nevertheless, the Rikerian theory, as controversial as it has been, also 
provides any student of federalism with a route to the study of federal political systems. 
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